

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.5

20 March 1962

ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 6 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 March 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. KRISHNA MENON

(India)

62-09877

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de SAN THIAGO DANTAS
Mr. de BELLO-FRANCO
Mr. C.A. BERNANDES
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LOUCANOV
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. V. PALINE
Mr. N. MINICHEV

Burma:

U Thi HAN
Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. H. GREEN
Mr. E.L.M. BUENS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. G. IGNATIEFF

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. DAVID
Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. M. ZEMLA

Ethiopia:

Mr. K. YIFRU
Mr. T. GEBREGZY
Mr. A. MANDEFRO
Mr. M. HAMID

India:

Mr. V.K. KRISHNA MENON
Mr. M.J. DESAI
Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. C. RUSSO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. M. TELLO
Mr. L. PADILLA NEEVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. J. WACHUKU
Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. A. HAASTRUP
Mr. V.N. CHIBUNDU

Poland:

Mr. A. KAPACKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. T. WISNIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. C. MANESCU
Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. M. MALITZA

Sweden:

Mr. O. UNDEN
Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. G.A. WESTRING

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A.A. GROMYKO
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. V.S. SEMENOV
Mr. V.P. SUSLOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M. FAWZI
Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. TALAAT
Mr. M.S. AHMED

United Kingdom:

The Earl of HOME
Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.W. RUSSELL

United States of America:

Mr. D. RUSK
Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. C.C. STELLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputies to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. T.G. NARAYANAN
Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): The fifth meeting of the Conference is called to order. I have on my list the names of four speakers, including myself as representative of India. On the whole, I think it will be best, if, at least as a matter of courtesy, I speak last.

Lord HOME (United Kingdom): When I was in London at the week-end my Prime Minister asked me to convey to this Conference his earnest hopes for the success of our deliberations, and to assure everyone here that the United Kingdom Government is determined to do everything in its power to bring about a disarmed and a peaceful world.

We in our delegation are very glad to sit down at this table with so many people who have given almost a lifetime of service in this cause -- none more distinguished than Mr. Padilla Nervo, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. We are also delighted to sit down with our colleagues of the eight nations who have come rather later into the arena of disarmament but who are of course acutely concerned with the results of our Conference and with the desire to see it succeed.

I want to say, too, that the United Kingdom delegation which is here has full authority to conclude with you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues agreements which would lead to the start of physical disarmament. For a very long time -- for long enough -- we have talked in generalizations of our desire for peace. I have no doubt whatever that all of us are sincere. But all the time the arms race has continued, confidence has diminished and fear has increasingly gripped us all. In my country, therefore, our conclusion is that the time has come to cease talking in generalities and to act.

Britain is a nuclear Power, on a much lesser scale of course than the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but it is nevertheless our fearful business to measure the scale of nuclear destruction, and it almost defies comprehension. We alone, with our nuclear armaments, could inflict damage on an enemy which would be totally unacceptable. Mr. Krushchev has reminded us in vivid terms that he could blow the United Kingdom to smithereens. Well, we know it; but we also know, and so does he, that nuclear war, if it came, would also completely lay Russia waste. Those are the melancholy, hideous facts.

Now, so far the nuclear deterrent has in fact deterred, but with the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons all the time growing more powerful and

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at the same time growing lighter in the warhead and therefore easier to deliver, none can say that in time of tension there might not be an accident which would start off the holocaust. That is why it is really urgent to begin physical disarmament now and to turn the curve of armaments production downwards. If our speeches can be devoted in future to that instead of saying how far we can blow each other to bits, at least that will be a notable improvement.

While it is time to switch from generalisations to action there is, as previous speakers in the Committee have said, value in the statements of principle which have been agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union. They are a very helpful guide to action.

But there is another set of principles which I would like to bring to the notice of the Committee, that is, the principles which were agreed at a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers last spring. I do that very briefly, and for two reasons. The first is that the principles are almost identical to those which have been agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union; and the second is that the modern Commonwealth represents a cross-section of world opinion in that it contains today countries that are in the defensive alliances and countries that are unaligned.

I would also call attention to two conditions which are common to both sets of principles -- those agreed between the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and those agreed (ENDC/5) between the United States and the Soviet Union -- and which in my opinion are absolutely central to the problem which lies before us in this Committee. Both these sets of principles deal with the necessity to eliminate weapons by stages, and they declare that at no stage shall any country or group of countries gain a significant advantage over another. That would suggest to me that if you try to take one category of weapons and abolish it in one stage, then the whole process of disarmament is going to be unbalanced, and that therefore the only way to proceed is by successive cuts of a strictly balanced nature all across the armaments board rather than by the abolition of one family of weapons, which, by accident or design, would give an advantage to one side or another.

Then again, both sets of principles say that there should be an adequate system of verification at each stage of disarmament. I will say a little more -- and something more specific -- if I may, in a moment, on this question in the

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context of the nuclear test ban, but I would like to say something about verification in general. I wonder whether we are not apt to talk of verification as a sort of private affair between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, about which it is possible to sit back and be rather critical or detached. Of course, it is much more than that. There are a number of places in the world where armed forces are today ranged facing each other; there are a number of countries which are in dispute with their neighbours. As I look around the table, I see that there are some countries represented here who are in dispute with their neighbours and whose armed forces are standing to. It is not only in Europe that this is the case. I therefore think that we should remember that each one of us is going to be called upon to disarm and each one of us is going to be asked to decide whether we can accept the word of our neighbour that he has in fact disarmed. So verification is not a private matter between the nuclear Powers; it lies at the very heart of the problem of disarmament for every one of us here in this room.

When we come to the detailed discussion, I think that what we have to do is this. We have to try to marry disarmament by stages with a system of verification which is sufficient to give confidence in three respects: that the arms which it is agreed should be destroyed are in fact destroyed; that the men it is agreed to demobilize are in fact disbanded; and that the weapons which remain cannot be a menace to peace.

I would like to ask Mr. Gromyko a question or two on the Soviet plan, always keeping in mind the two principles to which his Government has subscribed. In the Soviet proposals of 1960 and again in the Soviet-United States Agreed Principles, point 5, the Soviet Government has subscribed to this principle, which I will read to the Committee:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, page 2)

I do not want to prejudge Mr. Gromyko's draft treaty but I do want to call attention to one aspect of it, and that is that it includes in stage one the total destruction of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and the dismantling of all foreign bases. This would mean for us in Europe the return to America across the seas of all American troops in Europe, including Britain. If that is done in

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stage one, while the large Soviet conventional armies and equipment still loom over Europe, then I think although I should like to examine this further -- there is a case for saying that principle 5 to which the Soviet Union has subscribed is breached from the start. That obviously requires the most careful consideration. Again, I would like to take Mr. Rusk's proposals and give them further examination. As I understand it, there is to be a 30 per cent reduction of weapons right across the board, and therefore the balance will be preserved in stage one and at all subsequent stages until there is a total abolition of weapons -- arms, men and bases. My first examination of Mr. Rusk's scheme suggests to me that it does observe principle 5, to which the United States Government and the Soviet Government have agreed, because it would mean balanced disarmament at every stage.

There is another aspect of Mr. Rusk's scheme which I think has been underrated and to which so far we have given insufficient attention. It is the proposal that 50,000 kilograms of fissile nuclear material should be handed over to some international agency -- incidentally, I believe that is worth at least \$500 million. If the fact of balanced disarmament could be accepted by the Soviet Union, it would be an immense gain to us all.

It is here, I think, that this Committee can begin to do its useful work. We have before us a set of principles which is agreed by the United States and the Soviet Union, and we have before us two plans. Could we not take the plans and where they are consistent with the principles adopt and adapt them and where they are not amend them until they conform?

One of our troubles, I think, is that it is almost impossible to visualize a disarmed world. For years we have contemplated demobilization and disarmament and nothing has been done.

There are two great advantages, it seems to me, in proceeding by more modest but nevertheless substantial and continuing strides. Mr. Gromyko is one who likes jumping to the summit, but if I may take his own example of Mont Blanc, even the most experienced mountaineers try and get some training on the lower slopes before they get to the summit because by doing so they are more likely to arrive. And when a programme is adopted which is realistic and which all can see is possible, then its practical execution will give confidence to the people of the world.

I agree with Mr. Gromyko that various measures of disarmament should be linked, but my conception is of one link succeeding another in a continuing chain. When

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we see arms actually being destroyed and at the same time the balance of power being retained, although always at lower and lower levels, then everyone can gain enthusiasm because he will see that disarmament can be done without loss of national security. I would remind my colleagues -- they really need no reminder, of course -- that national security is something which no government, whatever its complexion, can gamble away. Therefore, the second task of this Committee, I would hope, would be to recommend a timetable for disarmament, neither so short or rigid that it is certain to break down nor so long drawn out and diffuse that it carries no conviction of purpose.

I think the Committee needs to ask itself what objection there is to this cut of armaments across the board in stages as proposed by Mr. Rusk. Only one answer has come so far -- and it came from Mr. Gromyko when he said that there should be no verification of arms which remained after agreed quantities had been destroyed, and that no control of replacements was acceptable because any inspection of that nature would mean espionage.

Quite clearly, at a very early stage of this Committee's work, unless we are to be completely halted, we shall have to have clarification from the Soviet delegation as to the amount of verification that the Soviet Union would feel justified in accepting in the field of general disarmament. If I may say so, this is not very clear from the draft treaty which Mr. Gromyko has given us.

But I would like to illustrate the difficulties involved in verification in the field of nuclear tests. As I understand it, the Soviet Union argues like this: all explosions are detectable by national systems and identifiable, and therefore there is no need for inspection. As I said to the Committee at our meeting last evening, we have no evidence as yet from the scientists which would support that argument. But let me suppose, for the sake of argument, that Mr. Gromyko's proposition is true. Even so, throughout the world in any given year there will be a number of doubtful noises which are heard. Now, supposing there is a dispute, as there is bound to be, between the scientists of the Soviet Union and the scientists of the West or other parts of the world, about some unidentified explosion. Who decides who is right? And unless somebody can decide, what happens? Mr. Uden put his finger on the point very clearly yesterday evening. I will give an illustration to the Committee based on something which happened only about ten days ago. There was a very loud explosion near South Georgia -- not

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Mr. Gromyko's South Georgia, nor Mr. Rusk's South Georgia, but our South Georgia; there is a sort of innocent geographical "troika" at work in this matter. The only way in which we could tell what that explosion represented was by going and looking. But we could go and look because this happened to be a place which was open to us to inspect. But if that unexplained noise had been in Soviet territory, we could not have gone to see. Therefore, if the right of an international team to go and look were denied, the side which was in doubt would be bound to assume that there had been a deliberate test. Why otherwise the refusal of inspection? And so the dreary round of tests would begin again. If there is no possibility of even the minimum of inspection, then there is really no effective test ban at all. We are not interested in espionage. All we seek is the absolute minimum of verification machinery. And again here I would like to ask Mr. Gromyko one question, because this has to be faced at an early stage in our consideration. If Mr. Gromyko would not agree to United States and United Kingdom or allied inspectors going in to explain an unidentified event, whom would he allow in? Is he really saying that no national of an unaligned country can be trusted to act as a member of such an inspection team? He said himself -- in fact I heard him say it and so did we all -- that he would not expect others to take the word of the Soviet Union. Well, who is to testify? Not, I take it, someone from the communist bloc? Would he accept nationals of non-aligned countries in the inspecting teams, or does he say that no national of a non-aligned State can be relied upon not to indulge in espionage? This question must be answered, and I pray that it will not be answered in the negative, because if it is, in this matter of a nuclear test ban I do not see how we can make any progress and help the world.

I would like to tell Mr. Gromyko that we in the United Kingdom want to co-operate with him, in the field of nuclear tests and in the field of general disarmament, in devising the absolute minimum system of verification -- for verification there must be or we will not gain the confidence to begin the ban on tests, let alone to attack the problem of wider disarmament. I welcome Mr. Zorin's proposal to establish a sub-committee of the three Powers. If we can agree on the minimum system of verification, well and good. If we cannot, then we will have to bring it back to the main Committee. I have dealt at some length with the problem involved in verification, because it is only that which stands between us and the conclusion of a nuclear test ban tomorrow.

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Mr. Gromyko in his memorandum last week stated that:

"It will be the implementation of disarmament measures, and not the armed forces and armaments retained by States at any given stage, that will be subject to control." (ENDC/3, page 8)

This is in the field of general disarmament.

I wish I could agree that this was enough, but I think this Committee will feel that there would be no international confidence if any State accepted a prescribed reduction and then refused to allow, under any conditions, verification that its remaining war potential did not exceed the limits agreed. Nations wage war with the weapons they possess and not with those that have been destroyed. In this connexion I shall be particularly interested to know how Mr. Gromyko will react to the sampling techniques of inspection, because I myself believe that they hold considerable promise.

Therefore, for my part, I feel we can arrive at the result, which we all want, of general and complete disarmament by a combination of the conceptions in both the United States and Soviet plans, namely, a continuous programme of disarmament proceeding at the highest practicable speed, with inspection of those arms which are destroyed and the minimum machinery of verification for the forces and arms which remain. There may at one time have been a great military advantage in secrecy -- I do not think any of us would deny that -- but as there is now no military advantage in war, where do the profits of secrecy lie? That is why verification lies at the centre of our discussions.

During its last series of tests the Soviet Union gained a great deal of military knowledge which will be of advantage to it. We are prepared to say to the Soviet Union here and now, "Keep your advantage. We are prepared, in spite of what you have gained in the latest series of nuclear tests in the autumn, to sign an agreement now if you will give the minimum machinery of verification." We do not stipulate what the exact system should be. We are ready to sign the treaty which we offered before the last series of Soviet tests began. We are ready to negotiate upon that treaty. Alternatively, we are ready to negotiate any proposal which has the adequate minimum machinery of verification, and we are flexible and ready for compromise.

Members of the Committee will, I think, recall -- and easily recall, because it was not so long ago -- the vote in the United Nations endorsing the principles

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of verification: a resolution, let me remind the Committee, supported by seventy-one Members of the United Nations. It is worth study, and if we work at it, we ought to be able to find the minimum system of verification consistent with the United Nations resolution and consistent with what Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko and the rest of us can accept. If we can do that we shall have done good work.

The United Kingdom was fully involved in the preparation of the complete disarmament plan which President Kennedy put before the United Nations last September. Also we give full support to the proposal Mr. Rusk has made to this Committee -- a basis, he reminded us, for discussion and agreement. There is certainly no shortage of plans, there is certainly no shortage of principles. All the elements of a disarmament treaty, as far as I have been able to see, are in the United States or the Soviet plan, and what we need is a programme of work. I should like to conclude by asking "how should we proceed?".

First of all I am sure we must keep the objective at all times clearly in our minds: we have to report to the United Nations by 1 June, and we want to report at least that we have broken out of the deadlock of the last few years. For that we need in this Committee both purpose and method. I would suggest, with diffidence, that we adopt the proposal made by Mr. Green yesterday. Of course it wants more examination but, as I understood it, it went something like this: that we should select from the two plans the subjects of agreement -- I think he named seven of them -- and on them we should frame definite procedures and draft treaties. Into this section I think might come, in addition to what he mentioned, declarations by those countries to agree not to give nuclear weapons to other countries, and also agreements by those other countries which have not got nuclear weapons that they do not wish to manufacture them or own them.

Secondly, I would have thought we might clarify those features of the Western plan and the Soviet draft treaty which clearly fall within the agreed principles, bring them together, compare them and examine them, and see if we cannot work out from them a programme of physical disarmament. Even if it were limited it would be extremely valuable.

Then again there are the aspects of the plan which are inconsistent with the principles. Perhaps -- I do not know -- there may be aspects of both plans which are inconsistent with the principles. If so we should select them, work on them, and see if we can amend them to bring them within the principles.

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Here I come back to the necessity to isolate and give most patient attention to the questions raised by the word "verification"; to how to deal with unidentified events and disputed events in the field of nuclear tests; to ways and means of making sure that at the time we move from one stage of general disarmament to another the arms which remain cannot menace the peace. And in particular, and I repeat what I said just now, we should give attention to the sampling techniques of inspection. That seems to me very important and it should be studied with particular care. I am afraid I have probably bored the Committee by repeating this so often, but back and back again I come to the question of verification as the point on which the success or failure of our Conference will turn.

You have a right to ask me, Mr. Chairman, "As you have raised the general aspects of the problem, what is the United Kingdom willing to do?". We are willing to work for the actual destruction of arms. We are ready to reduce our nuclear arms as proposed by Mr. Bush and at the same time to reduce our conventional armaments and to arrive at general disarmament within a time scale --- the Soviet Union says four years and the United States indicates nine. We will accept any machinery for verification on which this Committee can agree, and we will consider any proposals.

We are ready to play our part in an international disarmament organisation and co-operate with an international organisation for keeping the peace. We are ready to work out, with this Committee, arrangements to prevent surprise attack and to limit the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We are ready to stay here until these tasks are completed.

We have had many plans over the years, but all at last are agreed on a set of principles, and if we are agreed on principles, we ought to be able to agree on measures to implement them. My plea is that we should get down to work and look upon ourselves as a working party in this Conference. My pledge is that we will use all the zeal, ingenuity and diligence at our command so that the goal of general and complete disarmament may at last be reached.

Mr. MANESCU (Romania) (translation from French): The attention of the whole world is today focussed on the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee. Hundreds of millions of men of all nations are hoping that the negotiations we are

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conducting on the instructions of our Governments will provide an immediate solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament in order that war may be abolished and universal peace ensured.

On 18 February 1962, in replying to the proposal of Mr. Nikita Krushchev, Head of the Soviet Government, that the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee should start with a summit meeting, the President of the Council of State of the Romanian People's Republic, Mr. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, fully endorsed that suggestion. He added that "in the present circumstances when, owing to modern weapons, another war would bring incalculable destruction and disaster upon humanity, the question of disarmament must be discussed and settled with a sense of complete responsibility and with the greatest possible effectiveness".

I have quoted this statement at the outset in order to indicate our goal in participating in the negotiations for which we are assembled here. The delegation of the Romanian People's Republic is resolved to spare no effort and to offer its full co-operation in the execution of the task entrusted to us by the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.

We are thus acting in full awareness of the heavy responsibility that rests upon us. The Romanian people, like all the peoples of the world, attaches great importance to general and complete disarmament, and trusts that the Committee's work will be crowned with success.

The peoples of the world are faced with an extremely disquieting situation.

The arms race -- kept going by certain groups to which it brings profits -- is a factor which increases international tension and represents a grave danger to world peace. It is imposing an ever heavier burden on the shoulders of the peoples.

The accumulation of large quantities of instruments of destruction of hitherto unknown power has given rise to the present situation in which all mankind is threatened by a devastating war without precedent in history.

There is however one way out of this situation: disarmament -- general and complete disarmament.

The idea of general and complete disarmament, formulated by the Soviet Union, has won wide public support. World public opinion is pressing for the early achievement of general and complete disarmament. Life itself calls for the realization of this noble idea. This is proved by the fact that the question of

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disarmament has been placed on the agenda of numerous international conferences and also by the historic resolution adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in 1959; it is eloquently demonstrated by the international documents that define the task entrusted to our Committee.

The main features of the background against which the Eighteen Nation Committee is carrying out its work are the grave situation caused by the arms race and the need to bring it to an end.

In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, this leads to the conclusion that the principal task of the Eighteen Nation Committee is to proceed at once with the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In this connexion, we should like to refer to certain suggestions made here regarding the need "to continue our efforts at this Conference without interruptions" with a view to the preparation of an "outline programme", a "framework", a "joint declaration" and eventually a "treaty or treaties".

It seems to us that this approach is completely lacking in clarity. It cannot lead to the rapid and essential solution of the problem before us, namely, to general and complete disarmament, established by a treaty to be concluded in the shortest possible time.

Disarmament has been widely discussed, both in general and in detail.

It is time to move on to a new stage, that of drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament, based on the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. Protracted discussions might be used as a means of diverting public attention from the continuance of the arms race. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that the United States Government has announced its intention of resuming nuclear tests in the atmosphere, which can only give rise to general concern.

That is why we wish to restate our profound conviction that the Committee's task is to draw up a treaty on general and complete disarmament in the shortest possible time.

The existence of the Soviet-American Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, together with the representation in the Committee of the three principal groups of States that exist in the world today, are factors favourable to the work of our Committee.

It is particularly important that, at the very outset of our work, we should have a realistic and concrete draft treaty which is consistent with the principles

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of the United Nations Charter and can serve as a basis for the positive settlement of the disarmament problem. We have before us the draft Treaty submitted by the Soviet Union delegation, which is, moreover, designed to ensure the rapid progress so essential to the Committee's work.

What is the criterion by which we must assess the effectiveness of the proposals that have been submitted to us?

In the Romanian delegation's opinion, the fundamental criterion for assessing the effectiveness of any disarmament proposal is the effect that its implementation would have on the armaments race and the danger of war.

On examining the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty for general and complete disarmament under strict international control, we find that they meet that fundamental requirement. The Soviet proposal provides, upon the entry into force of the treaty, for the elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of all military bases situated in foreign territories and the withdrawal of troops to their national territories. It also provides for a reduction of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and those of the United States to 1.7 million men and, as regards the armed forces of other States, to levels to be determined; furthermore it provides for an appreciable reduction of conventional armaments, the prohibition of the launching of rockets for military purposes, the obligation on the part of States possessing nuclear weapons not to transfer them to other States or to transmit to such States information necessary for their production; and, finally, for the appropriate reduction of military expenditures.

The essential feature of the measures proposed for the first stage is the fact that they tend, from the outset, to remove the danger of a thermo-nuclear war and to put a stop to the armaments race.

The destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, together with the dismantling of military bases in foreign territories, would make an attack by means of these weapons practically impossible and mankind would thus be delivered from the greatest danger that has ever threatened it.

The reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, in conjunction with the other measures of the first stage, would appreciably reduce the danger of war.

As regards their content, timing and sequence, the implementation of the disarmament measures would have a beneficial effect on the entire international

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situation, dissipate the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion in international relations, and create favourable conditions for international understanding and co-operation, and for peaceful co-existence.

At the same time, by freeing the peoples from the heavy burden of military expenditures, general and complete disarmament would open up wide opportunities for utilizing vast human and material resources for economic and social progress, and for helping to promote the economic development of countries that have recently achieved independence.

It is not our intention at this time to examine in detail the measures submitted to the Committee by the United States delegation.

But in order to be in a position to express our point of view more fully in due course, we consider it necessary to emphasize that these proposals should be clarified and supplemented by the United States delegation and that they should be given a more specific nature, which, in our opinion, they now lack.

We would, however, point out now that, unlike the Soviet proposals which provide for the total destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons in the first stage, the United States proposal for merely a partial reduction of these means would not eliminate the danger of war, since most of these means would be retained.

The same remark applies also to the proposal for the cessation of production of fissionable materials and the transfer of a certain quantity of uranium 235 for peaceful uses. Such a measure would not in any way affect existing stocks of nuclear weapons.

We notice, at the same time, that the United States delegation says nothing about the dismantling of military bases in foreign territories. The existence of these bases constitutes a threat to peace and an obstacle to the improvement of relations between states.

I should now like to deal with the much discussed problem of control.

In our opinion, control is an integral part of the process of general and complete disarmament. Each disarmament measure should, from beginning to end, be carried out under the strictest international control.

Control should provide all possible safeguards, so that no State would be able to evade carrying out the disarmament measures within the agreed time-limits or shirk, in one way or another, the obligations it has assumed.

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At each stage of the disarmament process, the nature, methods and extent of control, and the functions and powers of the control body, should be appropriate to the nature and extent of the specific disarmament measures.

In the opinion of the Romanian delegation, the control measures proposed by the Soviet Government fully satisfy these requirements. Each stage provided for in the Soviet proposals represents an organic blending of disarmament measures and control measures.

While declaring ourselves in favour of the most efficacious control over effective disarmament measures, we have opposed, and still oppose, all proposals for the establishment of control over armaments. Such control is nothing but a means of obtaining military information needed for purposes other than those of disarmament.

The Romanian People's Republic is sincerely devoted to the cause of peace, to the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament and to the development between States of relations based on mutual respect, understanding and co-operation.

Our country's peaceful policy expresses the aspirations and fundamental interests of the Romanian people, who are devoting their efforts to the successful development of an advanced economy and to the realization of an abundant material and cultural life.

Faithful to its policy of peace the Romanian Government takes as its point of departure the idea that solutions of international problems can and should be wisely and patiently arrived at through negotiation. It is ready to support any move to create an atmosphere of international confidence and relaxation of tension.

In this connexion, we are convinced that the conclusion of regional pacts, including the creation of denuclearized zones, constitutes an important contribution to solving the disarmament problem and removing the danger of war.

Our delegation wishes to remind the Committee of the Romanian Government's oft-repeated proposals concerning the conversion of the Balkan region into a peace zone without atomic weapons, rocket-launching ramps and foreign military bases.

The positive response to our proposals in the countries of that region, and the fact that increasingly large groups are rallying to the idea of multilateral Balkan co-operation, show the existence of favourable conditions for carrying out such a proposal.

The Romanian Government will continue its untiring efforts to give effect to its proposals for the consolidation of peace and security in the Balkan region and in Europe.

(Mr. Manescu, Romania)

The Romanian delegation, in the sincere desire to create a favourable atmosphere for the progress of our Committee's work, and taking into account what has been said by the representatives who spoke before us, considers that it is wholly advisable to proceed to more fruitful and more organized activity. To this end, the delegation of the Romanian People's Republic wishes to submit the following proposals:

First, the Committee should proceed without delay at its meetings to examine the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet delegation. At the same time the Committee should also examine all the other proposals submitted here, such as those included in Mr. Dean Rusk's statement of 15 March 1962.

Secondly, since proposals have been made, in the speeches delivered so far, concerning partial measures calculated to lead to a relaxation of tension in relations between States - such proposals have been most clearly presented in the Soviet memorandum, but are also to be found in Mr. Dean Rusk's statement - the Romanian delegation proposed that a sub-committee be set up, consisting of the representatives of the eighteen States, to discuss the measures needed to relax international tension and ultimately to secure general and complete disarmament. It is obvious that these discussions should facilitate the work of our Committee and not distract our attention from the main problem: general and complete disarmament.

Thirdly, as regards the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, which is of particular concern to public opinion, the Romanian delegation proposes the appointment of a sub-committee of nuclear powers, that is to say the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Should France not send a representative, the representatives of the first three Powers would meet and begin negotiations with a view to solving the problem of the final discontinuance of nuclear tests.

The Romanian delegation requests the two co-Chairmen to meet and to arrange the work of the Committee on the lines we have proposed.

Mr. UNDEN (Sweden): It is not my intention to make any detailed comments on the most interesting proposals that the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted to this Committee. I shall rather give some views on the

(Mr. Unden, Sweden)

further work of the Committee, against the background of thoughts, ideas and papers so far presented. I shall add some remarks regarding certain special problems.

May I first express sympathy with the idea of Mr. Krishna Menon, similar in purpose to the proposal made by Mr. Green, that, wherever feasible and appropriate, a kind of informal consultation should be held with the authors of the disarmament plans presented, or with the experts on these plans. I do not doubt that this procedure will facilitate our understanding a number of important points in the plans and thus speed up our deliberations.

I believe it to be useful that delegates of the great Powers represented at this Conference should be given ample time for informal consultations. For obvious reasons it is on the great Powers that rests the main responsibility for bridging differences of opinion through mutual concessions and reasonable compromises. I agree with the statement by the Brazilian Foreign Minister in which he advocated a procedure which would consist in:

"exploring the limits of compromise consistent with maintenance of the present levels of security and conducting negotiating up to those limits."

(ENDC/PV.3, page 6)

No disarmament will be brought about without the countries concerned accepting the various measures proposed. Neither this Committee nor the General Assembly of the United Nations is endowed with the authority to enforce a programme of disarmament upon the Member countries. Thus, our hopes for positive results are entirely founded on the possibility that the Member countries, of their own free will, agree on a treaty on disarmament.

I wish to underline what I have already said, namely, that bilateral negotiations are necessary between the great Powers making important and complex proposals. They also need to be given reasonable time to negotiate on these proposals. A stalemate could, however, occur in these negotiations. This may increase tension and invite or compel the Governments of the great Powers to move in a direction inconsistent with the hopes and aspirations of a majority of mankind. Under such circumstances other members of this Committee may feel obliged to put forward proposals or compromises of their own in order to fulfil their obligations according to the mandate.

I do not imply that these other delegations should shoulder the responsibility of submitting a complete draft treaty on their own. But perhaps it would be

(Mr. Unden, Sweden)

possible for a number of delegations to agree upon certain specific recommendations, especially those that hold out hope of serving as a basis for compromise, even though they may not have been acceptable previously to either of the great Powers.

I have raised procedural questions already at this time without, however, wanting to start a debate at this instance on these points. Our hope, of course, is that the negotiations between the great Powers will succeed.

Some problems may suitably be isolated from the general debate on the main theme of full and complete disarmament and be treated as separate issues, should we as a Committee so desire.

Let us first consider a nuclear test ban treaty. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine that an agreement would not be within reach, in spite of all the evil omens to the contrary. At least agreement ought to be possible on a provisional treaty. The proposal to set up a sub-committee for considering this particular question seems to be timely and suitable. Should membership of such a sub-committee be limited to the three Powers which have up till now negotiated on a test ban treaty, it ought to be clearly understood that, should the great Powers not succeed in reaching agreement within a reasonable time, an enlarged sub-committee or an informal meeting of the full Committee would be given the chance to make new efforts.

I choose further at random some illustrative examples of problems that may be treated as separate issues. The latest United States proposal refers to a reduction of fissionable material for nuclear weapons use. The United States and the USSR would agree to transfer in the first stage 50,000 kilograms of weapon grade U-235 to non-weapons purposes. In the Soviet proposals for a treaty we find a provision about fissionable materials appropriately processed to render them unfit for the immediate re-establishment of weapons. The two proposals apparently have the same general purpose and thus could perhaps be treated together as an isolated issue.

Likewise, the proposal envisaging registration of launching of vehicles in outer space belongs to the kind of questions that might be treated separately. Mr. Green in his statement yesterday also gave other examples of problems that might be studied as separate issues.

The Swedish Government is of the opinion that the question of creating non-nuclear zones belongs to that category of problems which does not necessarily have

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to be tied inextricably to the general scheme for disarmament. Should the acting Secretary-General of the United Nations submit his report on the answers received to his questionnaire to our Committee, we may have reason to revert to this problem.

I have, as you will understand, no intention of proposing a procedure which would delay us by a series of separate studies on specific problems. I have only wanted to draw your attention to the possibility that the chances for success, at least within limited areas, might increase if we study a group of specific problems -- especially those which offer hope of a positive solution within the limits of control at present acceptable to the main parties -- simultaneously with the complex of problems entailed in our task of achieving general and complete disarmament. In this way we would proceed in accordance with point 8 in the United States-Soviet statement, which is the very basis of our work.

The CHAIRMAN (India): I will now speak to the Conference as representative of India.

I would like, first of all, to express the regret of my Government that our Prime Minister, who is also Minister of Foreign Affairs of India, is unable to be here owing to heavy internal commitments and for other reasons. It has therefore fallen to me to place the views of my Government before this Committee, not with any pretension to finality, but by way of usefully participating in these proceedings.

For well nigh thirty years meetings on disarmament, that is, on doing away with war, have been held in these buildings! In those thirty years, however, more and more weapons have been added to the armouries of nations, including that spurt during the war against Germany and Japan, culminating in the inclusion of nuclear weapons for destructive purposes. Yet perhaps the most comforting feature in this regard is that we have not given up hope in spite of all the failures. We still strive and have come here with the determination to find agreement on the banning of destructive weapons, on the elimination of all weapons of war, and ultimately on the outlawing of war as a method of settling disputes between nations.

In more recent times, until two or three years ago, the question was called "the limitation and balanced reduction of armaments." From that we made a departure two or three years ago -- I shall not bore the Committee with dates and resolutions -- when the United Nations unanimously approved of our purpose as general and complete disarmament. While this was a matter of debate some time ago, there are no nations now, great or small, which do not accept this proposition.

Therefore, by resolution 1378 (XIV), the General Assembly accepted general and complete disarmament as the goal. My Government agreed that this might be achieved either within the context of the organizational perimeter of the United Nations or outside it, and, along with various other Members, took some initiative and subscribed to the appointment of the Ten Nation Committee, consisting exclusively of the nuclear Powers and their allies. We waited patiently, believing very much in these bilateral and direct negotiations, until that Committee unhappily reached a deadlock.

Then came a period when no progress was made. Thus, along with eleven other nations we submitted to the United Nations on 15 November 1960 a draft resolution, which is United Nations document A/C.1/L.259.

(The Chairman, India)

I refer to this for two reasons. First, the Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty has referred to the communique on the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth. My Prime Minister signed this communique, along with the other Prime Ministers -- in the same way as the Soviet Union and the United States have signed the eight principles.

But, having mentioned this, I must state -- out of regard for our co-sponsors of the twelve-Power resolution, and in order to place this question in its proper context -- that the Prime Minister at that time, both publicly and privately, in conference and outside, clearly stated that the position of India is as expressed in the twelve-Power draft resolution, which is still on the agenda of the United Nations. We are happy to note that the eight principles more or less conform to the formulations in that draft resolution, and indeed both the United States and the Soviet Union have often mentioned this to us. But there are some differences between the two, differences which have been pointed out in United Nations meetings and which I need not go into at the present time.

Some time later, on 30 March 1961, the United States and the Soviet Union informed the United Nations that they were willing to undertake consultations in regard to the problem of full and complete disarmament. As a result, we have before us the eight principles on the basis of which we meet here today.

Later, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1722 (XVI), which is more or less our charter for meeting here. This resolution endorsed the agreement reached between the two great nations in regard to the composition of this Committee. Although that was in form a bilateral agreement, as everybody knows, it resulted from consultation. It has now been sanctified in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI). We meet here under instructions from the United Nations that:

"... the Committee, as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles and taking into account, inter alia, paragraph 8 of those principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control"

(General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI)).

I want first of all to say that my Government has at all times regarded control and disarmament as being inseparable; we do not think that one should follow the other or should obstruct the other.

(The Chairman, India)

In this context it must also be mentioned that about September 1960 the Soviet Union submitted a series of proposals which were later resubmitted on 15 March 1962 and which are now before us in what the Soviet Union has termed a draft treaty. They are, I presume, also corroborated and supplemented in the memorandum accompanying the draft treaty.

Similarly, we have before us another document, submitted by the United States of America on 25 September 1961 (A/4891), following a statement by the President of the United States, and which was resubmitted to us on 16 March of this year (ENDC/6). There is authoritative reason to believe that the United States is likely to develop this document into something more or less like a draft treaty. I say all this in order that it may be clear to us in this Committee that there are before us several manifestations of the way principles should be implemented, the main ones being those submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States.

A number of speeches have been made in this Committee, including so far two from the so-called uncommitted nations. Of the remaining eight, I believe four have said "We are already committed to such and such a plan", and the others have expressed their endorsement of the other side. Brazil, whose statement we heard on Friday, and Sweden, whose statement we have heard today, are two amongst the new members of the Committee who have spoken.

Reference has been made by the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom to the addition of the eight new members. It is not, however, as though we come to the disarmament discussions out of the blue, as it were. We are citizens of this world, Member States of the United Nations, and we have been participants in these arguments and expressions of views and in these endeavours for a disarmed world for a long time. Most of our nations, except perhaps the new ones, have been concerned in them. But what is most important is that both the two principal participants and their allies and the United Nations as a whole considered that a stage had been reached when this element of the non-committed in these confabulations is necessary and presumably useful. It is on that basis that we come here. We could be witnesses in the sense that one side or the other could not afterwards say: "This is what was said" or "This other is what was said", and then argument would go on as before; or we could contribute in some way perhaps to finding solutions to differences which often may not be nearly so deep, or perhaps could find some methods on the basis that over and above these differences are certain agreements.

(The Chairman, India)

The three nuclear Powers alone account for five hundred million out of a world population of nearly three thousand million. The allies of the nuclear countries, excluding the vast population of China, which is not a member of the United Nations as at present constituted, would be in the proportion of 2 to 1. But whether we are nuclear Powers or non-nuclear Powers, we are equally affected by the impact of the development of nuclear weapons, by their non-destruction, by the continuation of the advances made in them, and by the race in nuclear arms as in other armaments. The progress of science and technology has made war no longer a matter of dynasties or of countries or of nations, but one in which a country which is not actively participating can only submit to victimization.

Throughout these discussions there have been questions of motives, of difficulties, and other matters have been raised. It is the view of my Government, and my Prime Minister has specially asked us to proceed on this basis, that this Conference -- differently perhaps from previous Conferences, and certainly at least more than previous Conferences -- meets on a basis of a more passionate desire on both sides to find ways of agreement. It has been so stated, and so far as my Government is concerned, we accept those statements at their full and face value. That is, we are proceeding at this Conference in the belief that if there are difficulties in the way of reconciling positions, these arise either from historic circumstances or from suspicions or fear or lack of acceptance of data by one side or another.

We are not particularly wedded to any formula that is put forward, but at the same time we are wedded to certain conceptions which the Prime Minister put to Parliament in his last speech, namely, that disarmament must be full and complete -- it is now, in words, commonly accepted. This means a world without war, not a world which provides for nuclear weapons at the disposal of the United Nations, but in which, as has been proposed in the draft resolution of the twelve Powers, all these establishments would be demolished and we would have an entirely different situation.

It was interesting this morning that the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom hinted at the idea that we people are not accustomed to that sort of thing, that we cannot even mentally think of a world without, as they would say, the King's horses and the King's men. We must be gradually accustomed to the idea that war is not glorious or necessary and so forth. But, as he himself said, many of the purposes and reasons for the existence of these large quantities of arms have disappeared.

(The Chairman, India)

In the past the reasons were colonial expansion, the desire to capture markets, or perhaps to establish rival ideologies. All those reasons have fully and completely disappeared or are on the way out. It is inconceivable today that any country would try to conquer another by force of arms and subjugate it, or seek to advance commercial interests by forcible means, because this method defeats its end. Therefore, all that remains is security, and it is interesting that while considerations of national security must always prevail, my country at one time and for many years advanced the view that in this age security comes through peace and not peace through security. It is not merely juxtaposition of words, because in the pursuit of security for the establishment of peace we seem to sow the seeds of greater and more deadly war and conflicts. We have today come by sheer pressure of circumstances to an appreciation of the world in a more universal way. We have the following statement of President Kennedy:

"Men now know" -- I hope it is true in large measure -- "that amassing of destructive power does not beget security" -- if I myself had said that, it might have been the subject of comment in newspapers of a different character -- "they know that polemics do not bring peace. Men's minds, men's hearts, and men's spiritual aspirations alike demand no less than a reversal of the course of recent history ..." (ENDC/PV.2, page 15).

If I may say so respectfully, one could not have put it better.

The same proposition is put forward by the Soviet Union when it speaks about the sure and realistic way, lying in general and complete disarmament, of getting rid of the dangerous consequences with which the arms race is fraught.

The second aspect of our position in this matter, to which I shall refer later, is the speed with which disarmament must be accomplished. There are many reasons, the weight of armaments, the increasing disease that spreads over men's minds in the way of hatred, and the emergence of new causes, real or imagined, which divide nations. But apart from all that, we consider that either we disarm pretty quickly or the process of re-arming will go on, because in any very gradual procedure anything that would be accomplished would be subject to suspicions and difficulties of various kinds and new causes of suspicion and conflict would emerge. That is, if very violent disagreement between two people is going to be adjusted over a very long time, having regard to the background of animosity and the suspicion which exists, they themselves would be worse off during that period in which a small improvement might

(The Chairman, India)

be brought about. For that, if for no other reason, we have always advocated the speedy accomplishment of disarmament, so much so that my Prime Minister when speaking to the United Nations two years ago said that it is a question of trying to achieve it not all in one fine morning or in one piece, but as one piece with so many stages within it for the accomplishment of the whole thing in a short period of four or five years. As far as we are concerned, this is not borrowed from the Soviet treaty, it is the view of our Government.

Therefore, before leaving this point, I would say that this is really the main obstacle to us, that while there must be institutions for bringing about disarmament -- as Lord Home said, there must be physical disarmament in many ways -- all this must be accompanied by the creation of confidence and the assumption that if there are going to be evasions, this must be considered to be an inevitable possibility and methods must be found for avoiding them. None of us should take the view that only one side, and not the other, could evade. If evasions are going to arise from fear, then fear is common to all concerned. Therefore it is largely a crisis of confidence, which should not be dismissed as a mere phrase; it is something that exists in the world today. The more powerful a nation is, the more powerfully armed, the more afraid it appears to be. Therefore the security that is sought has today to be found in the scaling down of arms rather than in increasing them, because we have now reached the stage where any further addition to armaments could not produce any greater destruction than can be produced by what we already have. In other words, if you can destroy the world once with the arms that exist, there is no case for destroying it twice.

Therefore the fallacy that security can be built up by way of arms is gradually being exploded by facts, and even in the past twelve months, in publications and in speeches from all sides, there has been greater recognition of this fact.

Let us now look at the balance sheet of the proposals and the approaches and the objectives of different nations. It is quite easy, in a public meeting or a meeting where everybody is trying to be friendly to everybody else, to say: they are all saying the same thing, the differences are very slight. I believe that in plenary sitting one should perhaps lay greater stress on agreement and on common ground, only referring to the differences and difficulties, and that in private sitting, one should deal more with the difficulties and impediments in the way. One can therefore quite understand why the representative of Canada yesterday set

(The Chairman, India)

out the similarities. If one read that alone, and wanted to believe it, one would think that disarmament could come tomorrow. Of course, this common ground has increased in recent years and, side by side with it, the difficulties in implementing what is intended have also increased.

For example, we have today a common objective -- the common objective of general and complete disarmament. But when one gets down to examining it, the question arises: Is this a common objective to be reached if and when the first instalment is successful and then a second stage involving a fresh effort is to be contemplated and other and succeeding stages and so on, so that we ultimately get there? Or is it to be accepted as something for which the plans for a disarmed world are made from the very beginning and then the picture filled in little by little? These are two approaches to this problem about which there has been juxtaposition of minds and views. It is perhaps gradually getting narrowed down, but still the problem is there, and it is one of the problems we shall have to solve.

Now comes the question of inspection and control. Earlier I read out two paragraphs, one from Mr. Dean Rusk's speech and one from Mr. Gromyko's, which if viewed outside the context of this meeting might make people wonder what they were quarrelling about. Said Mr. Rusk:

"We do not ask a degree of inspection out of line with the amount and kind of disarmament actually undertaken." (ENDC/PV.2, page 23)

And in the Soviet Memorandum we read:

"... at each stage the extent of control should strictly conform to the extent and nature of the disarmament measures carried out in each stage."

(ENDC/3, page 8)

There is no doubt a slight difference of emphasis in these sentences, but the fact remains that looking through the documents before us we see that the United States has made proposals in regard to inspection at railway stations and in regard to physical inspection at various stages, and we thought at one time that this was a difficulty that could not be overcome.

The Secretary of State of the United States referred to:

"Advance notification of military movements, such as major transfers of forces ...

"Establishment of observations posts ...

"Establishment of an international commission on measures to reduce the risk of war..." (ENDC/PV.2, page 22)

(The Chairman, India)

I do not want to quote these things at length in a meeting of this kind as my advisers tell me that it has all been said in the last two days and everybody remembers it.

Then I look at the Memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union on 27 September 1961, in which it is also said that:

"The most practical steps which might be taken at an early date include the setting up of land control posts at railway junctions and major ports and on motor roads, the function of which would be to ensure that dangerous concentrations of armed forces and military equipment did not take place.

"The Soviet Government is of the opinion that the establishment of such land control posts might constitute an effective means of lessening the danger of surprise attack. No one is likely to dispute the fact that, even in this age of nuclear weapons, preparations for a large-scale modern war inevitably call for the concentration of large military units with large quantities of armaments and equipment ..." (A/4892, page 10)

Paragraphs which refer to this are also contained in the draft treaty which has been submitted. One refers more to the Soviet treaty in this connexion not in order to introduce any imbalance in this argument but because it is generally assumed that the resistance is more on that side. For example, in that draft treaty we read:

"Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures ..." (ENDC/2, page 7)

But later we read:

"Proportionately to the reduction of armed forces, as provided for in article 11 of the present treaty, the production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5-8 of the present treaty, shall be reduced." (ENDC/2, page 10)

And then it goes on in paragraph 2:

"Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article." (Ibid.)

As I have said, I will not burden the Committee by reading all this, but there are many such references. For instance:

(The Chairman, India)

"The production of nuclear weapons, and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons, shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes ...

"The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy." (ENDC/2, page 15)

I am not for a moment saying that each of these paragraphs can be taken separately and framed and said to be the whole idea of the proposal, but we are trying to point out that we have moved far away from the time when even such words created inhibitions and obstruction, and that we can perhaps now speak about them -- that may indeed help the purpose of this Conference.

Then we come to the negative or minus aspects. Firstly, with regard to time. Here we find ourselves on the side which wants to shorten the time. We were glad to hear the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom refer to this matter this morning. Two periods have been mentioned -- one of four years and one of nine years -- and even if it has taken two years to talk about it, once it does begin we think it ought to be concluded very quickly if it is to be concluded at all, because otherwise there will be too long a period of engagement during which difficulties may arise.

We ourselves have had some difficulties in the negotiations on the twelve-Power draft resolution before the United Nations -- with the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other -- in regard to what are spoken of as stages and phases. Those also are matters for us to consider here.

In the submission of my Government, all this discussion is conditioned by the tensions that exist in the world. In plenary sittings of this Conference it is neither necessary nor appropriate to refer to these, but it is quite obvious that if a number of parties are negotiating on a difficult problem difficulties in other spheres only add to their problems. Thus, the lowering of tension in those other matters is of concern to all of us; and while we may not be directly involved as States in those particular disputes, the elimination of any one of them, whether it be in Europe or in south-east Asia, would certainly contribute towards the lessening of suspicion and the elimination or reduction of points of conflict.

We welcome from both the United States and the Soviet Union the various degrees of stress laid upon flexibility. If we can, as a result of our work at this Conference, also lay some stress on the climate that is required for negotiation, we shall make some progress. Equally, it would be helpful if the sides concerned would take into account the concern of those nations, representing the majority of the peoples of the world, which really cannot put a brake on disarmament -- we cannot throw away atomic bombs because we have not got them -- all that we can do is to commit ourselves not to make atomic weapons, to the extent we have any capacity to make them. It would therefore be preferable not to limit in any way the concept of full and comprehensive disarmament by saying, "We will do a little and then see how it works and then go on to something else."

It is quite true that unless agreements already entered into have been fulfilled, it will be very difficult to go on to the next part. But, in our submission, if we are honestly committed to full and complete disarmament there must be an agreement by all States that what we are trying to do is to draw the blueprints, or the entire edifice -- or non-edifice -- of disarmament. From there we could fill in the edifice piece by piece -- taking into consideration all the difficulties to which Lord Home referred. To say that we will put up one brick and see whether it stands and then send for another brick will not get us anywhere. That is where our previous attempts failed.

As early as 1955, my Government submitted to the United Nations the idea that the Secretariat of the United Nations should produce a draft disarmament treaty. The climate and conditions having changed, such an idea could not be put forward now.

Now, the question arises what we have to do in this matter. Here, I can do no better than quote Mr. de San Thiago Dantas, the Foreign Minister of Brazil, who said:

"The second method, which is unfortunately much less frequently adopted, consists in exploring the limits of compromise consistent with maintenance of the present levels of security and negotiating up to those limits. This is clearly the only way to achieve effective progress in disarmament and, paradoxical though it may appear it is not the nations that possess nuclear weapons, but, on the contrary, those that do not, which can create the more favourable conditions for the use of this method." (ENDC/PV.3, page 6)

While we would not like to be categorical about the last part of that statement, we believe we should not be here unless we can make a contribution, if called upon to do so or if we find we can do so, in this respect.

(The Chairman, India)

Therefore, we come to the more practical, the more immediate purposes which face us. One is in regard to the treaty itself. We think that either a treaty, or a draft of a treaty, or the protocols of a treaty, covering the whole of this picture must emerge from this Conference. It would be wrong to say that this must be either a book or only a sheet of paper, or that it must be in this form or in that form or in the other form. We have from the Soviet Union what, in format, looks more like a treaty, and there is a proposal by Mr. Gromyko, supported by some others, that we should discuss it paragraph by paragraph in plenary sittings. Of course, if it is the general view of the Conference that this should be done, we would not object at all. But what we discuss in plenary sittings should be nearer the end of our deliberations than the beginning.

We would submit that for the purpose of this treaty there are three possible approaches.

I. The United States and the Soviet Union themselves might, through bilateral consultations and with the help of their nuclear allies, find a way to 'marry' these two documents and submit the result to us, even if it is still imperfect as a complete document. As I hinted a while ago, my country would never agree to the idea that there should be an international force which would use nuclear weapons in the future. But that is not a point of debate at the present time. As we have so often said in the United Nations, the United States and the Soviet Union sometimes speak a very similar language, that is, the language of power.

Hence, one way of approaching this matter would be for the Soviet Union and the United States to carry out direct negotiations and submit one document incorporating the various proposals now before us: the Memorandum of the Soviet Union, the outlines presented by the United States over a period of nearly a year now -- which we understand will be elaborated -- and so forth. Even if we could not agree with some parts of such a document, that would be one approach. But realistically speaking and having in mind all that has happened, this may not be a feasible method. At any rate, there is no reason why one method should be exclusive of the other. That is why we have said from the very beginning that there should be considerable room for bilateral, trilateral, public, private or informal talks.

II. This Committee might itself appoint a smaller body to do the really technical work of putting these things together and to tell us, "We find in these two documents these ways and means of getting together." Having regard to the

(The Chairman, India)

prejudices that exist, this is what we ourselves think -- and this was the idea that we originally intended to put forward.

But in order to be flexible we are also putting forward another idea.

III. It should be possible for a committee of this body, under the auspices of the two Co-Chairmen, to take the two documents as a basis and produce what might be called a "skeleton" treaty into which the various ideas could be fitted.

I believe that ten of the delegations here have now spoken. One may well hope that the plenary sittings will soon be over so that we can get down to the formulation of something that can be submitted to the United Nations by June in accordance with resolution 1722 (XVI). I do not think I am saying anything original when I say that there is considerable expectation in the world, in all our countries, about the outcome of our efforts. I say to both the United States and the Soviet Union that if, in a country like ours, there is not a great deal of loud agitation about peace, it is because there is no difference of opinion about the matter and not because there is not a volume of feeling; it may be that there are not so many visible demonstrations as in some other countries. If this Conference were simply to hear speeches and to say at the end "we agree to differ", that would not be satisfactory. We have to make a report to the Disarmament Committee by 1 June and, in our submission, that report should include the blueprints of a treaty or the agreement to make a treaty or any protocols to that effect. The closer it is to a complete document, a complete instrument that can be accepted by all sides, the nearer will be the day when disarmament itself starts.

Therefore, we put forward these three alternatives, with our own view that perhaps the preference is from the bottom upwards. That does not exclude all the talks that may go on in other ways.

On the general proposition I would like to communicate to this Committee what was said by my Prime Minister in Parliament only two days ago:

"In regard to foreign affairs or in regard to anything, the most important thing today is disarmament, looking at it from the world point of view, because if there is no disarmament the world will naturally drift more and more towards conflict, towards war, and undoubtedly if there is war it will be a nuclear war, and a possible war like that brought on without even a declaration of war.

We now come to the consideration of what have been called, not partial measures -- an unfortunate word which creates controversy -- but, shall we say, specific items which have been discussed here.

(The Chairman, India)

"Today, therefore, disarmament has become a question not of reducing armament by 10 per cent, 15 per cent, 20 per cent or 25 per cent. If this basic fear remains it does not matter how much you reduce it because it does not require, as figures are given, the thousands of nuclear bombs possessed by big nuclear Powers; a quarter of them are enough to wipe off the world or wipe off another country."

One can add to this that if after partial reduction there should be world conflict with the remaining weapons all the weapons that had been thrown away would come back on each side in six months or less, and new weapons would emerge. So the only answer to armament and the menace of war is total disarmament. There is no way of mending this situation, but only of ending it. Our Prime Minister added:

"If this Conference fails then it will be no easy task to come back to it. Some time or other the world will have to come to disarmament unless it destroys itself beforehand."

This is the submission we have to make on the general question.

With regard to these specific items, we think they should be considered simultaneously and an attempt made to implement them as soon as possible and appropriate. There is no reason for us to wait for the conclusion of a disarmament treaty, or a draft of it, before we consider other things or implement some of them. I shall take these matters not in order of importance but in order of convenience.

The first is an idea which has been endorsed by the United Nations -- it was originally proposed by the delegation of Ireland and is now being sponsored with great enthusiasm and a great deal of dedication by the delegation of Sweden. It relates to what may be called the non-spread of these weapons. We have ourselves advocated for a long time that the spread of these weapons to other countries not only increases the area of danger but also places them -- if one may say so without disrespect -- in less responsible hands. This creates more points of conflict, more chances of either catalytic or accidental war. The spread of knowledge about these weapons would ultimately lead to the production of them.

I would like to refer to another matter. We would not be satisfied -- and I hope this will not be regarded as too controversial -- merely with the idea that the technique of utilizing nuclear weapons would not be transferred to another country by a nuclear Power but that the weapon itself may be given. Nations today are sufficiently advanced for anyone who is given the weapons to find

ways of using them. Therefore it would not be sufficient for countries which possess nuclear weapons to say "We will give bombs to others but we will not tell them how to use them." They will soon find out. Therefore it means a complete dedication not to allow these weapons to get away -- a dedication to segregate them in the places where they now are. After all, if you have made them, it is safest for you to keep them pending their destruction. Why give them to anybody else?

The next problem is with regard to nuclear-free zones. We have subscribed to this proposition, and I am glad to say that the demand for nuclear-free zones spreads each day. Today we have added the Balkans to them; tomorrow we may add Scandinavia, and then the Pacific Ocean, so that the whole world would be nuclear-free. To the extent that the idea is spreading we are happy about it. But if we agree not to explode these bombs, ultimately to prohibit them, then of course the idea attains a different context. We are in support of these nuclear-free zones, but not on the basis that there are some places in the world that may be destroyed, that is, that there are expendable portions and non-expendable portions. That would be unfortunate for some of us; therefore we cannot accept it.

This is a suggestion -- originally made, I believe, by the former Secretary of State of the United Kingdom, Sir Anthony Eden, as he then was -- to create a free corridor in regard to war itself. Present ideas are developments in that direction. There is the Polish plan and the resolution passed by the United Nations in regard to Africa; we cannot say a great deal about the latter because France is not here -- and I should have said even before that my Government very much regrets the absence of the French Government. We hope this absence is a purely temporary one, and we hope, especially in view of the new developments which have taken place, that France will be able to come to our next meeting.

The next of these specific items relates to what my Government used to call, in discussions in the United Nations, an Armaments Truce, an idea which was ridiculed at the time. We have no specific propositions to put forward now in this respect, because at once we run up against the problem of the newer conception of mathematics in which "two" in one place does not mean "two" in another place, or something of that kind. That is to say that merely the quantum of weapons does not mean enough. It depends upon who possesses them and where they are, and so on.

(The Chairman, India)

We believe, however, on the whole, that if there were an agreement, particularly among the great Powers, to put some financial limits or energy unit limits in regard to production of weapons, a freeze could be achieved, and the armaments race, while it might not be reversed, might at least be arrested for a time. It is well known that the United States itself is carrying this year a heavier burden than in the past. The same must be true of the Soviet Union. Therefore we are in favour of any proposals that may lead in the direction of an armaments freeze.

I now come to the last of these specific items, namely, nuclear explosions. I have spoken so much about this in the last twelve months, without much purpose, I am afraid. Our position is the same in this matter: we are in favour of a treaty as sacrosanct as it can be made; we are in favour of any type of arrangements that can be made. But, pending those treaties, we are even more concerned to see to it that even the prospect of such a treaty is not jeopardised by explosions that may take place.

We have not the full report of the Prime Minister's speech in Parliament yesterday. He makes there a very fervent appeal to all nations not to commit themselves to explosions while this Conference is sitting. He said:

"I would beg of the great Powers to consider not having any tests while the Geneva Conference is sitting."

Reference has been made by Lord Home to the resolution passed by the United Nations supporting the establishment of a treaty. Not much authority need be quoted for this because everybody has been in favour of a treaty. The only trouble has been that three years of confabulation have not produced any results. It has been said that the treaty resolution, document A/RES/1649 (XVI) has had very considerable support — nearly seventy countries voted for it. Well, that is so, and we accept that. But I am sure the Secretary of State will not forget that resolution 1648 also was passed, and that resolution:

"... Earnestly urges the States concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests ..." (A/RES/1648 (XVI)),

and urgently calls upon everybody to establish agreement expeditiously. So let us not be less behindhand in stopping explosions forthwith.

Now if we were going to go by numbers, we would find that fewer people voted against suspension: that while fifteen people voted against the treaty resolution, only eight voted against the suspension resolution at that time. Having regard to the general context of thinking in the world, public opinion would not be

(The Chairman, India)

satisfied with all the excuses we could make, all the reasons we could find, and all the apprehensions, legitimate or otherwise, we might have. Our peoples are bound to ask "What is the war purpose, what is the military purpose, of further explosions?" If countries say that they will not carry out any more explosions if there is a treaty, then obviously there is no urgent military purpose in such explosions.

Then comes the question of detection. It has been said in another place that it is not a question of detection: it is a question of creating confidence in peoples all over the world that testing is not taking place. We make the following suggestion.

We are not prepared to say at the present time whether every explosion is detectable or not detectable. At the same time we submit that ours here is not an academic exercise. We are not trying to find out whether anything can be exploded in a laboratory or whether there could be an earthquake which could be mistaken for an explosion. By and large, is it possible to find out whether anybody is violating a treaty?

Secondly, this Conference meets on the basis that agreements will be made and kept; otherwise why should we meet, why should we try to make agreements if we are sure beforehand that they will be broken? We can naturally make provision against the temptation on the part of people to get round them. Therefore we would say that any kind of agreement which by and large is feasible should be sufficient for the purpose -- Mr. Uden called it a provisional agreement. Whatever we do, if there are more explosions, what will happen to the work of this Conference and the atmosphere of peace and confidence that must be created in the world? There is nothing so dangerous as turning people into cynics in this matter.

We welcome the statement made by the Soviet Union yesterday that it is prepared to enter into new discussions, here or elsewhere. We also welcome the response made by the United States and the United Kingdom. For three years the ingenuity of men of several nations has been found wanting with regard to reaching a settlement. These negotiations should go on while we are here, if possible. For years these tests have been regarded not only as dangerous to mankind in their immediate effects, but also as the engine of nuclear war. We have a right to see that every attempt is made to reach agreement. If the initial efforts do not lead at least to a temporary agreement for the cessation of nuclear tests, then I think it is the bounden duty of this Conference to put this matter before a special committee appointed for that purpose.

(The Chairman, India)

We would also suggest that if the idea is that one cannot take for granted the results of the detection efforts by any one of the three countries involved in this matter -- that is to say, if the United States is not prepared to accept the judgement on this score of the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union, or the other way round -- it may be worth considering whether scientific detection stations could be established by national efforts in other countries or could be internationally established. If it is possible to spread bases all round the world or to manufacture these weapons in large quantities, it should also be possible to establish these peace stations in various parts of the world, in countries that are only partly committed or are uncommitted to the two blocs. Then, in the event of an explosion, the results would come in from everywhere. Today we measure radiation, and the results are internationally communicated. We may adopt a similar procedure. Therefore, as a compromise measure, it could be agreed for the time being that we should have other monitoring stations from which results would be received. If all the data collected pointed to one result, there would be no difficulty; if there were differences of opinion, then it would be for us to consider what could be done about them.

The main explosions we are worried about at the moment are explosions in the atmosphere and the biosphere. These, it is admitted on all sides, can be detected, and the committing of such explosions -- there is no other word for it -- would be a violation of an international agreement. If there was a straightforward agreement between the nuclear Powers that there would be no more explosions and, if any were detected afterwards, that would be proof of the violation of the international treaty. That is all, in any case, that we could do. There is no way, except in a world State, of sending people from one place to another in order to enforce a treaty.

However difficult may be the problem, however much we may distrust anybody else, the very basis of this Conference is that there should be agreements. Yet agreements cannot be left merely to trust. They must be on the basis of the undertaking of international obligations, and countries which violate international obligations will face the consequences. That is the way of international life as we know it today.

We have no desire to exaggerate this problem of explosions, but it has got so much into the mental make-up and fears and apprehensions of people and nations that it has almost come to be regarded as the acid test of what the great countries are prepared to do. People ask themselves: "If they are not going even to stop tests, how will they abolish weapons?" How are we to explain this to our people?

(The Chairman, India)

The same applies to the means of carrying these nuclear weapons. A number of mathematical and other arguments have been put forward by the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom in regard to this weapon or that weapon. This can be discussed but, when the Soviet Union has such formidable weapons as long-range rockets, the destruction of these weapons cannot but be a factor of safety to the rest of the world. Therefore, while there may be holes in this, we may plug these holes; but we should not throw the baby out with the bath water, which would happen so far as nuclear tests are concerned, if this Conference did not at least bring about the suspension of such tests. While we are sitting here, tests are being contemplated by one country. It is unfortunate that in the period of suspension the Soviet Union broke the suspension that obtained and there was an explosion, about which we all protested at that time. But in that period of fifteen or eighteen months it was not a question of a lack of detection, it was not as though explosions had taken place clandestinely; what happened was that the suspension was disregarded, for whatever reasons, and there was the well-known explosion.

Therefore, it appears that the whole problem of detection is being projected disproportionately and given too much precedence. It really is not a problem, but a conundrum. We suggest that there should be an immediate agreement to make an agreement -- and a resulting cessation of tests -- pending a treaty. This Conference should appoint some machinery to go into this matter in order to reconcile the different positions.

We make the suggestion for what it is worth -- we do not make a proposal -- that inspection stations on a scientific basis may exist and could be established on national or international initiative, in various parts of the world so that the network of detection would be closer. The more people who watch, the less avoidance there will be.

It seems that most of these questions, at the present moment, at any rate, are concerned with explosions in the air and above the air. With regard to the air, looking from the ground will not help. If the Soviet Union wants people to go there, the United States wants people to go to the United States; we are not against it. It is good for traffic and other things. But this should not be put as an impediment to what very much concerns the people of the world.

(The Chairman, India)

We also regret the general tendency to quote scientists as more or less sanctifying these explosions. This was also brought out many years ago at the United Nations, when we were asked to agree to a limited number of explosions. We then said that that was more or less licensing vice, which we could not do. We have no doubt that these explosions are a threat to humanity in more ways than one. While we may not agree with one school of scientists against another, these explosions, even though the radiation emitted may not pass the "safe limits", as they are called -- and these safe limits are not like the laws of the Moes and Persians, they change from time to time -- have effects upon humanity, biologically, genetically, psychologically and otherwise. They constitute a grave danger. What is more, they create a kind of lack of respect for certain nations. The nuclear nations, instead of appearing to come to a compromise under pressures, we submit, have a responsibility for initiative in this matter.

Whatever happens in this Conference our first step, and one of the steps we must inevitably take, whether by informal meeting or by bilateral or multilateral negotiations, is to do our best to get a concession -- what is usually called "face-saving", which I hope will not be the case here -- whereby the system of detection need not necessarily be unilaterally national, but may be otherwise. If, as the result of agreement, other and more binding, acceptable methods are found, we would only be more pleased.

Therefore, I submit these proposals for what they are worth. We suggest, first, that committees should be set up now for the drafting of these treaties, or of whatever might take their place.

Secondly, we suggest that we should agree without any further argument on the non-spread of these weapons, a matter on which Sweden has taken the initiative in the United Nations and one to which my Government has subscribed.

Thirdly, we believe that we are all in agreement with respect to nuclear-free zones, subject to the conditions that it is not to be thought that there are some expendable areas of the world.

The cessation of nuclear explosions -- one does not speak any more forcibly than necessary -- is a question which must have a very high priority. I think it was Mr. Rusk who said that the highest priority must go to the prevention of nuclear war, or something of that kind -- I do not remember the exact phrase now.

(The Chairman, India)

We do not take the view that we have come here as onlookers, merely to bear witness to what has been said and what has not been said, because war and its consequences make no exemptions based on race or creed or geography, or anything of that kind.

We have also now come to a stage when people are not speaking about these weapons as deterrent weapons. There was a time when it was even said that nuclear weapons were merely deterrents. Now we hear it said here and there and everywhere, "If it comes, it comes and we shall have to meet it". We heard that said this morning. The more humanity gets conditioned to such an attitude, the greater will be the difficulty of preventing war and even more of outlawing it.

Speaking now as Chairman, I have been asked to announce that the co-Chairmen of the Conference have agreed to recommend that another informal meeting be held today in Conference Room III at 4 p.m., on the same basis as yesterday's meeting.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its fifth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, Minister for Defence and representative of India.

"The representatives of the United Kingdom, Romania, Sweden and India made statements.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 21 March 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.